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IS NOW THE TIME FOR SIMPLIFIED RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE?
Paul V. Niemeyer*
On June 15, 1215, at Runnymede along the banks of the River
Thames, King John agreed, in response to forceful demands of the
English barons, to the restoration of the traditional English liberties
included in Henry I's Charter of Liberties. The document, later de-
nominated the Magna Carta, promised, as an early form of due pro-
cess, that "no free man shall be taken or imprisoned or
dispossessed, or outlawed, or banished, or in any way destroyed...
except by the legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the
land."1 And it included immediately thereafter the procedural
promise, "To no one will we sell, to no one will we deny, or delay
right or justice."2
Just as the Magna Carta's promise of judgment by peers under
the law of the land animates current notions of due process, its
promise not to sell, deny, or delay justice is the fountainhead of the
stated role of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which directs
that the Rules "should be construed and administered to secure the
just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and pro-
ceeding. '3 Thus beginning with the Magna Carta and continuing to
now, we happily subscribe to the fundamental goal that our civil
process not delay right or justice.
Unfortunately, any objective evaluation of current federal civil
process will inevitably lead to the conclusion that the process is
functioning inadequately in its purpose of discharging justice
speedily and inexpensively. One need only ask any trial lawyer
whether he can try a medium-sized commercial dispute to judg-
ment in a federal court in less than three years and at a cost of less
than six figures. Is the iconic appellation of "making a federal case
* Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit; Chairman, Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1996-2000;
Member, 1993-96.
1. KINGJOHN, MAGNA CARTA (1215), reprinted in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 17 (Richard
L. Perry &John C. Cooper eds., rev. ed. 1991).
2. Id. (emphasis added).
3. FED. R. Cirv. P. 1 (emphasis added).
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out of a dispute" not the ultimate condemnation of currentjudicial
process in federal courts? Can we understand the private bar's
flight from federal courts to arbitrations, mediations, and other
methods of alternative dispute resolution as anything but the bar's
vote against the process provided by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure?
We rightly fear the answers to these questions, which we see in
our own observations and in the available empirical evidence. And
because we do, I submit, the time has come for a systematic review
of civil process with a genuine openness to undertaking a serious
and determined effort to simplify the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.
When I was Chairman of the Civil Rules Advisory Committee,
Professor Edward H. Cooper, the Committee's Reporter, and I initi-
ated just such an undertaking. My tenure as Chairman, however,
which had already been extended, ended in 2000, before we made
much progress in this endeavor. Professor Cooper nonetheless pre-
served the beginnings of our effort in his essay, Simplified Rules
of Federal Procedure?.4 It is now time, I suggest, to revisit these
beginnings and draw upon Professor Cooper's experience and
leadership to resurrect this important and necessary effort.
** *
With the adoption in 1938 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, a new experiment in judicial process was begun. Before 1938,
the rules of pleading were strict and complicated, and discovery was
minimal and difficult to obtain. Charles Edward Clark, the first Re-
porter of the Civil Rules Committee, did not believe "that most law-
yers were sufficiently skilled to meet rigorous pleading
requirements" or that "elaborate pleadings were a useful way to
expose facts or narrow issues." He advocated simple, flexible rules
that combined law and equity and afforded broader discovery. As
George Ragland, Jr., author of the then-famous 1932 book, Discov-
ERY BEFORE TRIAL, had observed, "' [t] he lawyer who does not use
discovery procedure is in the position of a physician who treats a
serious case without first using the X-ray."' 6 Both Ragland and
Clark believed that greater clarity in the definition of the issues
4. Edward H. Cooper, Simplified Rules of Federal Procedure?, 100 MICH. L. REv. 1794
(2002).
5. Stephen N. Subrin, Fishing Expeditions Allowed: The Historical Background of the 1938
Federal Discovery Rules, 39 B.C. L. REv. 691, 711 n.133 (1998).
6. GEORGE RAGLAUND, JR., DiscovERY BEFORE TRLAL 251 (1932).
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would be obtained by greater discovery, adopting the views of Pro-
fessor Edson R. Sunderland of the University of Michigan:
False and fictitious causes and defenses thrive under a system
of concealment and secrecy in the preliminary stages of litiga-
tion followed by surprise and confusion at the trial .... All this
is well recognized by the profession, and yet there is wide-
spread fear of liberalizing discovery. Hostility to "fishing
expeditions" before trial is a traditional and powerful taboo.
7
Indeed, Sunderland, who later became the principal drafter of
the new discovery rules, believed that "[m]ost of the restrictions
upon the free use of discovery are not only unnecessary but cause
an enormous amount of trouble to the parties and the courts in
construing and applying them."8
Accordingly, the newly adopted 1938 Rules merged the diverse
procedures for law and equity and simplified pleading, adopting
what we now refer to as "notice pleading."9 At the same time, they
transferred the function of fleshing out complaints to discovery and
an expanded motions practice. To serve this "revolutionary" new
role, the scope of discovery was broadened and greatly facilitated. 10
Discovery devices were granted as of right, and its scope was broad,
ultimately defined to permit inquiry into information not only rele-
vant to claims and defenses but also relevant to the subject matter
involved-and the term relevant information was not limited to ad-
missible evidence but included information "reasonably calculated"
to lead to admissible evidence.11 In addition, the regulation of dis-
covery was largely transferred from the court to the attorneys for
the parties. With these changes, the 1938 Rules and its subsequent
amendments prescribed what would inevitably become a more pro-
tracted pretrial process.
While the 1938 Rules thus shifted procedural battles, perhaps
unwittingly, from pleading to discovery, they also reassigned resolu-
tion of the battles from the court to the attorneys for the litigants.
7. Edson R. Sunderland, Foreword to GEORGE RAGLAND, JR., DIscOv-ERY BEFORE TRIAL, at
iii (1932).
8. Subrin, supra note 5, at 716 (quoting Edson R. Sunderland, Improving the Administra-
tion of CivilJustice, in 167 ANNALS OF THE AM. ACAD. OF POL. & Soc. Sci. 75-76 (1933)).
9. See, e.g., Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 611 (2002); Conley v. Gibson,
355 U.S. 41, 47-48 (1957).
10. See Armistead M. Dobie, The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 25 VA. L. REv. 261, 275
(1939) ("If the term 'revolutionary' can be correctly applied to any part of the new rules, that
part is discovery.").
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1970).
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As enigmatic as this idea would appear when considered for appli-
cation in a strong adversarial context, it was nonetheless taken as a
well-intended experiment to replace the highly restrictive pretrial
process that had existed before. In addition to failing to anticipate
the problems that would arise from adversaries being directed to
resolve their own disputes, the idea failed to recognize that such
disputes would also enhance attorney compensation.
The bench and bar were initially hesitant to move in this novel
and "revolutionary" direction for resolving civil disputes, and this
prompted a campaign to highlight its benefits. In a speech before
the annual meeting of the State Bar of California shortly after the
1938 Rules were adopted, entitled "The New Spirit in Federal Court
Procedure," Judge Lewis E. Goodman urged those of the bench
and bar who were hesitant to get with the program. 12 Judge Good-
man explained:
The adroit procedural maneuvering of the earlier days in the
pleading stage, often invoked to deprive a litigant of his day in
court, is now relegated to the archives.... Thus the complaint
and the answer need do no more than, in colloquial manner,
state on the part of the complaining party "you did" and on
the part of the answering party, "I did not." . . . But pleadings
no longer determine the issues to be tried. In effect, all they
do is generally apprise the parties of the nature of the claim
and the defense. Thus time and effort and expense is saved.
Much of the reluctance to accept the philosophy of the new
procedure was due to a failure on the part of many lawyers and
of some judges to distinguish between the pleading stage in
litigation and the trial preparation stage. Information in the
pleadings stage is widely different from information as to evi-
dentiary matters necessary for proper trial preparation.
Whereas simplification is made the keynote of pleadings, wide
opportunity and liberality in the obtaining of information as to
factual matters needed for the trial is made the keynote of the
discovery rules. 13
The new era of dispute resolution was thus launched, based on
the commencement of cases with minimally articulated complaints
and the provision for liberal discovery thereafter, with the idea that
the case could suitably be tested for viability later in the process
12. Lewis E. Goodman, The New Spirit in Federal Court Procedure, 7 F.R.D. 449 (1947).
13. Id. at 450.
[VOL. 46:2
Time for Simplified Rules of Civil Procedure?
with a robust motions practice. And, as could be anticipated, discov-
ery thus became the vogue, and experts in discovery became the
successful litigators.
Over the years, more expansive discovery was authorized through
a series of amendments to the Civil Rules in 1946, 1963, 1966, and
1970. The 1938 idea of shifting evaluation of the case from the
pleading stage to a time after the completion of discovery was in-
creasingly emphasized, and with the increased emphasis grew a
more expensive and expansive procedural process, not only be-
cause of the expansion of discovery rights but also because of the
explosive growth of recordkeeping, recorded information, and
data. In addition, the self-regulation aspect of discovery contributed
to new rights. Professor Paul Carrington, a professor at Duke Law
School and a former Reporter to the Civil Rules Committee, ob-
served that we now have "900,000 attorneys running about with al-
most unrestrained subpoena power."14
Under the new scheme, it was anticipated that the parties would
go to court infrequently to resolve discovery disputes, as they were
expected to act in good faith to resolve their differences. But when
aggressive discovery and motions practice became a successful ap-
proach to pursuing litigation, discovery disputes became the prime
source of cost and delay. Indeed, attorney self-regulation routinely
deteriorated into warlike, mean-spirited brawls. Document produc-
tion often became synonymous with "flood the opposition and ex-
pense them into submission." Depositions often became multi-day
grilling sessions in which grace, manners, and gentility became the
exception. Lamenting the burdens of discovery costs, the Supreme
Court noted that one deposition in a defamation case "continued
intermittently for over a year and filled 26 volumes containing
nearly 3,000 pages."' 5 And parties and witnesses, who had exper-
ienced depositions, sought to avoid them as they would the plague.
The crisis was exacerbated in no small part by the Supreme
Court's decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 6 which directed courts to ac-
cord discovery "broad and liberal treatment.' 1 7 In Hickman, the
Court explained that "[n]o longer can the time-honored cry of
'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring into
the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual knowledge of all
14. Statement of Paul Carrington, Professor of Law, Duke University to author about
renovating discovery, (Mar. 1997) (on file with author); accord Paul D. Carrington, Renovating
Discovery, 49 ALA. L. REv. 51, 54 (1997).
15. Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 176 n.25 (1979).
16. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
17. Id. at 507.
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the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper liti-
gation."' 8 Over the next twenty years, Hickman, combined with the
pro-discovery mantra stated in the Rules' amendments, led courts
to resolve most doubts about the propriety of discovery in favor of
providing the discovery. And the bar-and indeed soon, the pub-
lic-began to complain.
The liberalization of discovery, and its attendant costs, soon led
to a multifaceted movement to restrict its broad scope. In 1976,
Chief Justice Warren Burger convened the Pound Conference in
order "to assess the troubled state of litigation."' 9 The conference
concluded that "[w]ild fishing expeditions, since any material
which might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is discov-
erable, seem to be the norm. 20
In 1977, the American Bar Association (ABA) embarked on a ma-
jor effort to persuade the Civil Rules Committee to restrict the
broad scope of discovery delineated in Rule 26, proposing to limit
discovery to "any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
issues raised by the claims or defenses of any party."2' This proposal was
initially accepted by the Civil Rules Committee in proposed amend-
ments. After circulation for public comment, however, it was elimi-
nated from the final draft, along with other aspects of the ABA
reform proposals. 22 Three justices of the Supreme Court dissented
from the eventual adoption of only minor adjustments to the Rules
and the rejection of the ABA's recommendations, suggesting that
the "Court's adoption of these inadequate changes could postpone
effective reform for another decade. '23
But the ABA proposal did not die, and it was again presented to
the Civil Rules Committee by the American College of Trial Law-
yers, informally in 1995 and formally in 1997. At the time, Rule 26
18. Id. (footnote omitted).
19. Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L.
REV. 1, 9 (1992).
20. William H. Erickson, The Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for
the justice System in the Twenty-First Century, 76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978).
21. Report of the Special Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse, 92 F.R.D. 149,
157 (1977).
22. See Edward D. Cavanagh, The August 1, 1983 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A Critical Evaluation and a Proposal for More Effective Discovery Through Local Rules, 30
VILL. L. REv. 767, 779 n.54 (1985).
23. Dissenting Statement ofJustice Powelljoined byJustices Stewart and Rehnquist, 446
U.S. 997, 998 (1980).
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permitted discovery relevant to "the subject matter involved in the
pending action."24 The College proposed an amendment to the
rule that would provide that "parties may obtain discovery regard-
ing any matter, not privileged, which is related to the claim or defense
of a party."25 The College anticipated that such an amendment
would help stem the tide of emerging complaints. In 2000, the
Rules Committee and the Supreme Court adopted this recommen-
dation in part, replacing the phrase "subject matter" with "claim or
defense" in Rule 26(b) (1).26 The new rule, however, still provided
the court with authority to order discovery into matters relevant to
the "subject matter" if the party seeking such information could
show good cause. The amendment was thus "designed to involve
the court more actively in regulating the breadth of sweeping or
contentious discovery. '2 7
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, even lay observers of the legal
system began complaining that the costs of pretrial discovery were
out of proportion to the contribution that discovery made to the
dispute-resolution process. In August 1991, the President's Council
on Competitiveness issued a report claiming that the judicial system
had become burdened with excessive costs and long delays. The
report claimed that each year the United States was spending an
estimated $300 billion as "indirect cost[s] of the civil justice system"
and $80 billion in direct costs. 28 And the report blamed discovery as
the chief culprit. It claimed that "[o]ver 80 percent of the time and
cost of a typical lawsuit involves pretrial examination of facts
through discovery."29
Congress too began to focus on the issue; in 1988, it enacted the
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act of 198830 with the
longstanding goal that the federal court system secure the 'just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action."' l Congress
concluded then that
the Federal judiciary is beset by problems in all three of these
areas: delay caused by rising caseloads and insufficient support
24. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(b) (1993).
25. Letter from American College of Trial Lawyers to Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
(c. 1995) (on file with author).
26. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b) (1) advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendments.
27. Id.
28. Dan Quayle, Agenda for Civil Justice Reforms in America, 60 U. CIN. L. REv. 979, 980
(1991).
29. Id. at 981.
30. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.).
31. H.R. REP. No. 100-889, at 23 (1988) (footnote omitted).
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services; spiraling costs caused by litigation expenses and attor-
neys' fees; and unfair and inconsistent decision caused by the
pressures placed on judges who must cope with the torrent of
litigation. 32
The Act was thus enacted with the specific purpose of "moderniz-
ing" the rule-making process, to recognize and encourage alterna-
tive dispute resolution, to deal with mass disasters, and to improve
the Federal Judicial Center.33
But even with enactment of the 1988 Act, public pressure per-
sisted, and Congress again undertook to enact legislation to reduce
costs and delay in litigation. Prompted by this pressure, then-Sena-
tor Joseph Biden initiated a study by the Brookings Institution, and
proposed a bill for numerous judicial "improvements" based on its
findings.34 Under the proposed bill, Congress intended to become
significantly involved in the day-to-day management of federal cases
to reduce costs and delay and to increase judicial efficiency.
Alarmed by perceived threats to judicial independence, the Third
Branch initiated discussions and negotiations with Senator Biden
and Congress, resulting in substantial reductions of Congress's pro-
posed intrusion. The compromise became the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 1990 (CJRA). 35
The CJRA required each federal district to conduct self-study and
to develop a civil case management plan for the purpose of reduc-
ing costs and delay in litigation. 3 6 Also, to evaluate a package of
congressionally mandated management techniques, the Act pro-
vided for the establishment of ten pilot districts employing the
mandated techniques and ten comparator districts, with an evalua-
tion of the twenty districts to follow. 37 The Institute for Civil Justice
at RAND was then retained to conduct the evaluation. Its unprece-
dented study of the federal courts collected data from over twelve
thousand cases in twenty representative districts. s When evaluated,
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. THE BROOKINGS INST., JUSTICE FOR ALL: REDUCING COST AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGA-
TION (1989).
35. Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 471-482 (2006)).
36. Id. § 104.
37. Id. § 105.
38. The four reports that comprise that evaluation are JAMES S. KAKALiK ET AL., INST. FOR
CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, AND INEXPENSIVE? AN EVALUATION OFJUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT
UNDER THE CIVILJUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996);JAMSs S. KAALiJ ET AL., INST. FOR CIVILJusTICE,
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVIL JuSTICE REFORM ACT IN PILOT AND COMPARISON DISTRICTS
(1996); JAMES S. KAA I ET AL., INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE
MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JusTIcE REFORM ACT (1996), available at http://www.rand.
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the data revealed no single, easy path to reducing costs and delay.
Indeed, it was striking that the study did not find much difference
in the levels ofjudicial efficiency between the pilot districts and the
comparator districts, indicating that the congressionally mandated
techniques for case management yielded little improvement tojudi-
cial efficiency. Some explained that the judges involved in the man-
dated program did not come to the experiment with the positive
attitude necessary to make the program work, and others
concluded that the entire experiment was ill conceived and
doomed at the outset by its vagueness.
The RAND study did, however, reveal several important facts that
could be useful in guiding any future reform initiatives. First, the
data supported the conclusion that early court intervention in the
management of cases reduced delay, even though it also increased
litigant costs. 3 9 Second, the data confirmed that setting a firm trial
date early was the most effective tool of case management, reducing
delay without any adverse impact on cost.40 And third, the data indi-
cated that controlling discovery by reducing its length (i.e., by es-
tablishing an early cutoff date) reduced both costs and delay
without adversely affecting attorney satisfaction.41
Following the enactment in 1990 of the CJRA, although not di-
rectly responsive to it, the Civil Rules Committee did adopt several
amendments in 1993 to the Civil Rules relating to case manage-
ment and discovery.42  The case management rules focused
principally on providing more explicit flexibility and guidance in
entering case management orders, discovery orders, and other pre-
trial orders. Most of these changes were made to Rule 16. The Com-
mittee at the time also elected to amend the discovery rules to
org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographreports/2007/MR802.pdf; and JAMES S. KARALjK
ET AL., INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, AN EVALUATION OF MEDIATION AND EARLY NEUTRAL EVALUA-
TION UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT (1996). This essay focuses on the third report,
EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVILJUsTICE REFORM ACT [hereinaf-
ter "REPORT"].
39. REPORT, supra note 38, at 55 ("Early judicial case management is associated with
both significantly reduced time to disposition and significantly increased lawyer work hours.
Our sample data show that the costs to litigants were also higher in dollar terms, and in
litigant hours spent, when cases were managed early.").
40. Id. at 56 ("In terms of predicting reduced time to disposition, setting a schedule for
trial early was the most important component of early management. Including early setting
of trial date as part of the early management package provides an additional reduction in
time to disposition, but no further significant change in lawyer work hours.").
41. Id. at 67-68 ("Shorter time from setting a discovery schedule to discovery cutoff is
associated with both significantly reduced time to disposition and significantly reduced law-
yer work hours .... These benefits are achieved without any significant change in attorney
satisfaction or views of fairness.").
42. See FED. R. Clv. P. 26 advisory committee's note to the 1993 amendments.
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require mandatory disclosure of specified discoverable information.
These changes, which are included in Rule 26(a), require parties to
disclose up front-without the need for a request-witnesses, docu-
ments, damage computations, and expert testimony.
In 2000, the Rules Committee made more changes, which fur-
ther expanded mandatory disclosure, limited the scope of discovery
as of right by enacting the proposal made by the American College
of Trial Lawyers, and limited the use of various discovery tools by
reducing the length and number of depositions, as well as the num-
ber of interrogatories.
Finally, the Supreme Court, in its decisions, also reacted directly
to problems of costs and delay in civil process. Beginning about the
same time as the Pound Conference and the initial ABA effort, the
decisions and language of the Court began to reflect more hesi-
tancy toward broad discovery rules and, in a variety of ways, indi-
cated a need to control discovery. The Court's decisions also began
to focus on the benefits of enhancing pleading requirements.
For example, in a 1975 decision, the Court lamented the "poten-
tial for possible abuse of the liberal discovery provisions of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure" and the importance of preventing
parties from utilizing discovery as a means of influencing the
"settlement value" of a case rather than as a means of "reveal[ing]
relevant evidence." 43 Several years later, in Herbert v. Lando, the
Court noted that "mushrooming litigation costs" were in large part
due to pretrial discovery, declaring that "[t]here have been re-
peated expressions of concern about undue and uncontrolled dis-
covery, and voices from this Court have joined the chorus. '"44 The
Herbert Court emphasized that discovery rules are "subject to the
injunction of Rule 1 that they 'be construed to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action"' and that dis-
trictjudges should therefore "not hesitate to exercise appropriate
control over the discovery process." 45 And it made clear that appro-
priate control over the discovery process meant protecting parties
and persons from "annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or un-
due burden or expense. "46
43. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 741 (1975).
44. 441 U.S. 153, 176 (1979).
45. Id. at 177 (quoting FED. R. Cirv. P. 1) (emphasis added).
46. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c)); see also Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S.
20, 34 (1984) ("It is clear from experience that pretrial discovery by depositions and interrog-
atories has a significant potential for abuse."); Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752,
757 n.4 (1980) ("[M]any actions are extended unnecessarily by lawyers who exploit or abuse
judicial procedures, especially the liberal rules for pretrial discovery. The glacial pace of
much litigation breeds frustration with the federal courts and, ultimately, disrespect for the
law.") (internal citations omitted).
[VOL. 46:2
Time for Simplified Rules of Civil Procedure?
The Supreme Court also tightened qualified immunity standards
in constitutional tort litigation, with a focus on the high cost of dis-
covery, and it took a restrictive view of discovery in transnational
commercial litigation so as to "protect public officials from the
'broad-ranging discovery' that can be 'peculiarly disruptive of effec-
tive government,' '' 47 and to "protect foreign litigants from the
danger [of] unnecessary[ ] or unduly burdensome [ ] discovery."48
In addition to addressing the costs and delay inherent in discov-
ery, the Court also began to address the benefits of enhanced
pleading and summary-judgment procedures. In Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
trett,49 the Court noted the importance of the summaryjudgment
process to the protection of the rights of defendants faced with
meritless claims in a notice pleading system. And in Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 50 the Court addressed directly how the quality of
pleading was a facet of mitigating potential abuses in discovery. It
explained that "it is self-evident that the problem of discovery abuse
cannot be solved by 'careful scrutiny of evidence at the summary
judgment stage,' much less 'lucid instructions to juries,' . . . ; the
threat of discovery expense will push cost-conscious defendants to
settle even anemic cases before reaching those proceedings.."51 The
Twombly Court accordingly held that a complaint must allege
"enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest that an [antitrust]
agreement was made," characterizing this requirement as a "plausi-
bility" standard.52 A couple of years later, in Ashcroft v. Iqbal,53 the
Court restated the standard, holding that to survive a motion to
dismiss, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, ac-
cepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face."' 54 Explaining its adjustment to the 1938 notice pleading con-
cept, the Court stated "Rule 8 [General Rules of Pleading] marks a
notable and generous departure from the hypertechnical, code-
pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of
47. Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6 (1987) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 817 (1982)).
48. Socite Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for the S. Dist. of Iowa,
482 U.S. 522, 546 (1987).
49. 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
50. 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
51. Id. at 559 (internal citation omitted); see also id. at 557-58 ("[S]omething beyond the
mere possibility of loss causation must be alleged, lest a plaintiff with 'a largely groundless
claim' be allowed to 'take up the time of a number of other people, with the right to do so
representing an in terrorem increment of the settlement value"') (quoting Dura Pharm., Inc.
v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 347 (2005)).
52. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556.
53. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
54. Id. at 678 (internal citation omitted).
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discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than
conclusions." 55
At bottom, however, these reform efforts by Congress, the Civil
Rules Committee, and the Supreme Court have not taken on the
larger structural problem arising directly from the 1938 experi-
ment, and an inappropriate level of costs and delay persists in civil
process.
To learn more about the root causes of cost and delay in civil
process, the Civil Rules Committee requested two studies to collect
empirical data. At the Committee's request, the Federal Judicial
Center conducted a national survey of lawyers, the response to
which was broad and informative.5 6 The Committee also requested
that the RAND Institute for Civil Justice review its massive database,
developed in connection with its evaluation under the CJRA in
1990, and provide answers to particular questions about discovery
that those data might reveal.57 Both the Federal Judicial Center and
the RAND Institute provided the Committee with comprehensive
reports.
From the reports, as well as conferences it held in San Francisco
and Boston, the Civil Rules Committee learned that the mechanism
for obtaining information through discovery in connection with the
resolution of civil disputes was thought to be both necessary and
desirable by virtually all legal constituencies. No one in the legal
community seemed to be interested in eliminating the requirement
of full pretrial disclosure of relevant information.
The Committee also learned that discovery was working effec-
tively and efficiently in the majority of federal cases. Indeed, discov-
ery was not used in almost 40 percent of the federal cases and was
used to the extent of three hours or less in another 25-30 percent
of the cases.
In civil cases where discovery was actively used, however, both
plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys found it unnecessarily expen-
sive and burdensome. The plaintiffs' attorneys complained most in-
tensely about the length, number, and cost of depositions, while
55. Id. at 678-79.
56. The Federal Judicial Center's study was reported at a conference at the Boston Col-
lege Law School in September 1997. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discov-
ery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rules Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525 (1998).
57. James S. Kakalik et al., Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform
Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REv. 613 (1998).
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defendants' attorneys complained most intensely about the number
of documents required for production by document requests and
the cost of selecting and producing them. While the data revealed
that the cost of discovery in all federal cases represented approxi-
mately 50 percent of litigation costs, in those cases where discovery
tools were actively employed, it represented roughly 90 percent of
litigation costs.
The data also showed that trial attorneys representing both plain-
tiffs and defendants believed that the costs of discovery disputes
would be reduced substantially by greater and earlier judicial in-
volvement in the process. They maintained that the level of
efficiency was directly proportional to the level of early judicial in-
volvement in the process. These conclusions seemed to challenge
one of the premises of the 1938 Rules experiment: that discovery
could carry the burden of fleshing out claims and that the manage-
ment of discovery could be managed well by the adversaries them-
selves. Remarkably, the Federal Judicial Center found that
approximately 83 percent of all attorneys polled wanted some
change to the discovery rules.
Finally, the Committee learned that early discovery cutoff dates
and firm trial dates were the best court management tools for re-
ducing costs and delay in litigation.
From 1999 to 2000, as Chairman of the Civil Rules Committee, I
began to recognize that the 1993 and proposed 2000 amendments
to the Civil Rules were little more than band-aids for addressing the
complaints of cost and delay in the judicial process. Litigants were
still complaining and seeking to avoid court process through alter-
native dispute resolution.
In thinking about the problem, I had extended discussions with
Professor Cooper, our Reporter, and Professor Geoffrey Hazard,
who was leading the American Law Institute's effort in designing
transnational rules of civil procedure. We explored what features
might be considered essential to civil process, what might be con-
sidered baggage, and what a fair and inexpensive process might
look like.
As a result of these discussions, Professor Cooper and I broached
the idea of initiating a project to draft "simplified rules" of federal
procedure to the Civil Rules Committee and to the Standing Rules
Committee. All members who expressed any view welcomed the
idea. Professor Cooper then wrote and presented an initial draft of
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the Simplified Rules that would be included as supplemental rules to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 58 The Civil Rules Committee
was never able, however, to begin a detailed debate on the project,
as my tenure ran out. But Professor Cooper's early work was not
undertaken in vain, as it is preserved, and now should be employed
as a starting point to revisit the 1938 experiment.
As Professor Cooper later wrote of the draft, it has as its "central
feature . . .a major transfer of pretrial communication away from
discovery and to fact pleading and disclosure."59 This observation
articulated a fundamental and necessary course correction to the
approach taken in 1938.
The proposed draft specified a mandatory application of the
Simplified Rules to all small money-damage actions and an elective
application to larger money-damage actions. It would not require
that the Simplified Rules be applicable to all money-damage actions
or to other actions.
Substantially, the draft incorporates five basic elements, all of
which neatly address known problems of costs and delay in federal
civil process. First, the draft requires pleadings to become more de-
tailed, enabling an early serious look at the merits of a case. Under
the proposal, a complaint would state "the details of the time, place,
participants, and events involved in the claim," and would have at-
tached to it "each document the pleader may use to support the
claim." 60 This approach to some degree anticipated the approach
that the Supreme Court later took in Twombly and lqbal. In Iqbal, for
example, the Court stated:
To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain suffi-
cient factual matter, accepted as true, to "state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face." A claim has facial plausibility
when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court
to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not
akin to a "probability requirement," but it asks for more than a
sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Where
a complaint pleads facts that are "merely consistent with" a de-
fendant's liability, it "stops short of the line between possibility
and plausibility of 'entitlement to relief.' "61
58. Cooper, supra note 4, at 1804-20 (reproduction of the Reporter's Draft).
59. Id. at 1800-01.
60. Id. at 1808 (quoting Draft Rule 103(b)(1)).
61. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted).
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The draft also authorized the immediate disposition of some
claims through the use of verified complaints and answers and a
mini-summary-judgment process. Under the draft, the answer
would likewise have to state the defendant's position with the same
detail required for the complaint, including the factual basis for
any avoidances and affirmative defenses.62
Second, the draft would enhance early discovery disclosures,
which would have to be made within twenty days of the filing of the
last pleading. While retaining Rule 26 requirements in part, the
draft would mandate a greater level of disclosure, more closely imi-
tating what would amount to a fundamental level of discovery but
without the need for a request. Combined with the enhanced
pleadings, this second proposal "front-loads" pretrial communica-
tions so as to enable earlier and less expensive disposition of cases.
Third, the draft would restrict discovery, presumptively authoriz-
ing only three three-hour depositions, ten interrogatories, and only
requests for documents and intangible things that "specifically
identify" the matters requested.63
Fourth, the draft would reduce the burden of the motions prac-
tice, requiring that all motions be combined and filed early in the
proceedings-within thirty days of the last pleading64-and provid-
ing that their filing not suspend any other time limitation
established by the Rules.
Fifth and finally, the draft would require that when a complaint is
filed, the clerk of the district court would have to schedule the trial
of the case not later than six months after the filing date,65 and that
the trial date would be included in the summons served with the
complaint.66 This one change was found by the RAND Institute to
be the single best practice for reducing costs and delay in
litigation. 67
Although Professor Cooper's draft proceeds with caution-per-
haps wisely-had I been able to continue with the project, I would
have pressed for consideration of three additional ideas. First, I
62. Cooper, supra note 4, at 1808 (quoting Draft Rule 103(b) (2)).
63. Cooper, supra note 4, at 1818 (referencing Draft Rule 106(d)-(f)).
64. Id. at 1812 (referencing Draft Rule 104A(d)).
65. Id. at 1818 (referencing Draft Rule 109(a) (1)).
66. Id. at 1818 (referencing Draft Rule 109(b) (1)).
67. Kakalik et al., supra note 57, at 655 ("In our further analysis of judicial discovery
management policies, we again found that a statistically significant reduction in time to dis-
position was associated with early management without setting a trial schedule early, and a
significantly larger reduction was associated with early management that included setting a
trial schedule early.").
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would have asked that we consider expanding the scope of applica-
bility for the Simplified Rules, making them available for all damage
actions and mandatory for a larger segment of damage actions.
Second, I would have us explore whether incentives could be en-
hanced to encourage both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys to
elect to use the Simplified Rules in all money damage actions. Mak-
ing the Simplified Rules mandatory or enhancing incentives would
address the problems recently identified by the 2010 Conference
on Civil Litigation, which concluded that "few lawyers would opt for
a simplified track and that many would seek to opt out if initially
assigned to it. ' '68
Third, I would have initiated a discussion aimed at trimming
down the scope of and practice under Rule 56, which now has be-
come an expensive mini-trial within the pretrial phase of the larger
case, resulting in disproportionate costs and delay.69 The Supreme
Court's trilogy of summary-judgment cases in the mid-1980s ap-
pears to have expanded the use of Rule 56 summary judgment and
emphasized its importance in a system of notice pleading that al-
lows broad discovery. 70 Under Simplified Rules that would place a
greater emphasis on pleading, the role and scope of the Rule 56
motions practice could be reduced. Indeed, in my later years of
trying cases as a lawyer, I found that it was often more efficient and
less costly (and also strategically superior) to press for trial without
engaging in the summary-judgment process.
As matters currently stand, federal civil process is simply too
time-consuming and costly, by a large margin. While the intents
and purposes of the 1938 experiment were laudable in the context
in which they were conceived, it is now time to review the experi-
ment with, I suggest, a consideration of the Simplified Rules pro-
ject. Moreover, the growth of new forms of documents and new
68. JUDICtAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ON THE 2010 CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 9 (2010), available at http://
www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/Report
%20to%20the%2OChief% 2OJustice.pdf.
69. See D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illu.sions, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 273
(2010).
70. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus.
Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317
(1986).
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concerns about preserving them to avoid sanctions have only esca-
lated the need for a fundamental reform.71 Nothing short of a seri-
ous dialogue on reform would discharge the Judiciary's current
unmet responsibilities under Article III.
To be sure, it would be naive to suggest that Simplified Rules
would solve all problems-today's litigation world is too complex
for such a hope. But such an undertaking would refocus attention
on the big picture, as was done in 1215 and 1938, and open the way
to the implementation of modern thinking on our judicial process.
71. See Patrick E. Higginbotham, The Present Plight of the United States District Courts, 60
DuKE L.J. 745, 751 (2010) ("Efforts to construct gates for access to discovery must address the
marriage of notice pleading and discovery that was fundamental to the 1938 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, confronting both the difficulties it has wrought and its instrumental role in
enforcing legislative and constitutional norms."); see a/soJohn H. Beisner, Discovering a Better
Way: The Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DuKE L.J. 547 (2010).
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